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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal lies with the Utah Supreme Court
which pursuant to order transferred this matter to the Utah Court
of Appeals on or about August 16, 1994. Jurisdiction in the Utah
Court of Appeals is vested pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j).
ISSUES RAISED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did appellant produce sufficient evidence at trial to

establish a prima facie case that a dangerous condition existed
in the elevators of which appellees had or should have had
knowledge in time to repair or replace?
Standard of Review:
In reviewing the granting of a motion for directed verdict
by the trial court, the appellate court examines the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-prevailing party to determine
if the evidence would support a judgment.
2.

Was the trial court precluded by this Court's prior

opinion in Kleinert v. Kimball, 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 1993),
from determining whether plaintiff presented a prima facie case
sufficient to reach the jury?
Standard of Review;
Appellate Court review of a trial court determination of an
issue of law is based on the standard of whether the trial court
correctly applied controlling law to the issue, the so-called
"correctness" standard.
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3.

Did the trial court err in not submitting the case to

the jury on a common carrier liability theory?
Standard of Review:
Same as 2, above.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah R. App. P. 3 0(a).
(a) Decision in civil cases. The court
may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise
dispose of any order or judgment appealed
from. If the findings of fact in a case are
incomplete, the court may order the trial
court or agency to supplement, modify, or
complete the findings to make them conform
to the issues presented and the facts as
found from the evidence and may direct the
trial court or agency to enter judgment in
accordance with the findings as revised.
The court may also order a new trial or
further proceedings to be conducted.
If a
new trial is granted, the court may pass
upon and determine all questions of law
involved in the case presented upon the
appeal
and
necessary
to
the
final
determination of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an action for personal injuries.

Plaintiff below

and appellant herein claims to have been involved in an elevator
accident on April 16, 1984.

The alleged accident took place at

a building located at and known as 185 South State.

Defendants/

appellees (hereinafter "defendants" or "Boyer Company") were the
owners and managers of the building

and

its elevators.

An

elevator service contract had been purchased by defendants from

2

the manufacturer and installer of the elevators, Kimball Elevator
Company, previously a party to this action.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Plaintiff's alleged accident occurred April 16, 1984.

Her

action for personal injuries was commenced in the Third Judicial
District Court on or about March 17, 1988, approximately one
month before the expiration of the four-year statute of limitations.
Defendants originally were the manufacturer and installer of
the

elevator

"Kimball"),

system,

and

Kimball

Elevator

Company

the owners and managers

question, Boyer Company, et al.

(hereinafter

of the building

in

The case proceeded forward at

the trial court until motions for summary judgment were filed by
both Kimball and Boyer Company.
were granted

and plaintiff

The motions of both defendants

appealed.

hereinafter referred to as Kleinert

That previous appeal,

I was decided by the Utah

Court of Appeals on or about June 4, 1993.

See Kleinert v.

Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah App. 1993). This Court
upheld Kimball's motion for summary judgment for lack of evidence
of a defect in the elevators.
reversed.

Boyer's summary judgment was

This Court remanded for further proceedings.

Upon remand the case proceeded to a jury trial on March 22,
1994.
trial

At the close of plaintiff's case on March 24, 1994, the
court granted

finding

the

defendants' motion

plaintiff

had

failed

3

to

for directed

produce

verdict

evidence

of a

dangerous condition in the elevators of which defendants had or
should have had knowledge.

(Finding of Fact, Record pp. 1064-

1068).
Plaintiff

then

brought

this

(Kleinert

appeal

II) .

Defendants have previously filed a motion for summary disposition
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10. The Utah Supreme Court reserved
ruling on said motion pursuant to Rule 10(f) in its order of July
8, 1994.
This appeal was poured-over to the Court of Appeals from the
Utah Supreme Court on or about August 16, 1994.
C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Background,

Because this is an appeal from the granting of a motion for
a directed verdict, this brief will focus on the evidence
produced at trial during plaintiffs case relative to the two
claims of error raised in this appeal. Those are: (1) was there
evidence of a dangerous condition in the elevators of which Boyer
Company knew or should have known prior to plaintiff's alleged
accident of April 16, 1984, and (2) was evidence produced by
plaintiff

to

establish

liability

under

the

common

carrier

standard of care?
The purpose of this factual review is also to demonstrate
the

difference

between

"malfunctions", of

which

there was

evidence at trial, and "dangerous conditions" creating a duty by
Boyer Company to repair or replace.
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2.

Review of Trial Evidence,
(a)

Generally.

Before resting her case

(Record pp. 1675, 1676 and

1041),

plaintiff called 16 witnesses including herself over the course
of three days.

Of plaintiff's witnesses six were health care

providers and one was a records custodian who offered no evidence
regarding

liability.

The

testimony

of

the

remaining

nine

witnesses will be reviewed seriatim.
The only other evidence produced by plaintiff relevant to
liability consisted of the service and material receipts (Exhibit
8-P,

Record

p.

1276),

plaintiff's

summary

material receipts

(Exhibit 2-P, Record

service

agreement

between

Company

(Exhibit

concerning
Boyer

and

Company

6-P,

copies
and

Boyer

Record
of

and

1266)

elevator

Kimball

p. 1234),

Company
p.

service

Elevator

of the

service

and

the

elevator

Kimball

Elevator

and

correspondence

agreements

(Exhibits

P3

between

through

P7,

Record pp. 1307, 1308).
(b)

Review of Trial Evidence,

1. Plaintiff's
Kleinert.
alleged
building.

Mr.
prior

first

Kleinert
problems

witness

offered
with

the

no

was

her

testimony
elevators

husband,
regarding
in

Karl
any

defendants'

Likewise, no testimony was given by Mr. Kleinert as to

the standard of care of building owners or managers or whether
other

safety

measures

could

have

been

taken.

Mr.

Kleinert

offered no evidence that there were any problems or conditions
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with the elevators of which defendants knew or should have had
knowledge.
2.

(Testimony of Karl Kleinert, Record pp. 1180-1203).
Plaintiff's second witness was one of the two attorneys

for whom she worked at Parsons, Behle & Latimer at the time of
her alleged accident.

That witness, Mr. David Hirschi, offered

no evidence regarding a dangerous condition in the elevator or
knowledge thereof on the part of the building owner or manager
prior to April

16, 1984.

Likewise, Mr. Hirschi offered

no

evidence regarding the standard of care of owners or managers of
buildings or whether any such standard was breached by defendants
in this case.
3.

(Record pp. 1205-1220).

The next witness was a co-worker, Merleen Pearce.

No

evidence was offered through Ms. Pearce regarding the standard of
care of building owners or managers or any claimed breach of such
a standard of care.

No evidence was offered that other safety

measures could have been adopted.

(Record pp. 1221-1228).

Ms. Pearce testified knowing of two occasions when she was
"stuck" in the elevators.

(Record p. 1223) .

However, she also

testified that neither she nor anyone else was injured in any
way.
around"

(Record p. 1225) .
or

"knocked

(Record p. 1226).

In particular, no one was "bounced

to the

floor" as claimed

by

plaintiff.

Also, Ms. Pearce could not recall whether

either incident was before plaintiff's alleged accident.

She

testified that it was just as likely that it was after as before.
(Record p. 1227) .
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Also, there was no evidence offered through Ms. Pearce that
any such incidents, even if they occurred before plaintiff's
incident, were ever reported to or made known to defendants,
(Record pp. 1220-1228).
4.

Plaintiff's next witness was Mr. Brent Russon, the

local manager of Kimball Elevator Company.
mony not only failed to establish

Mr. Russon's testi-

any evidence of dangerous

condition in the elevators at or prior to plaintiff's alleged
accident (Record pp. 1230-1275), but affirmatively established
the following:
(a) The service and material receipts were records of
all service calls made by Kimball and used for billing Boyer
Company.

(Record p. 1238) .
(b) Under the elevator service agreement purchased from

Kimball by the Boyer Company, there was no period of time that
the elevators were not covered under a service agreement or
warranty.

(Record pp. 1278-1280).
(c) In the contract accepted by Boyer Company there was

no compromise of elevator safety.

(Record p. 1280) .

(d) Boyer Company had procedures in place to report to
Kimball all service needs for the elevators.

(Record p. 1283).

(e) The fact that there is a service call does not mean
that there is a safety problem.

(Record pp. 1282-1283).

(f) He never received calls or reports from any source
of injuries or safety hazards regarding the elevators in question

7

at or before the time of plaintiff's alleged accident.

In this

regard, Mr. Russon's testimony was as follows:
Q. Well, let me ask you this.
Without
taking the time now to review all those,
based on your personal recollection, Mr.
Russon, and your dealings with both the
Boyer Company and your involvement with
the elevator service at the building at
185 South State, do you have any
recollection of reports coming in during
this 1983 and early 1984 time frame of
the elevators either injuring or harming
any of the occupants or those types of
safety issues coming in from any of the
service calls that you receive?
A. No.
Q. Would it be fair then to say that so far
as you were concerned those elevators, at
least through April of 1984, were free of
complaints that they were injuring or
harming any people?
A. Yes.
Q.

In fact, you've never received up to that
time you've never received any report,
had you, of elevators dropping and rising
several floors at a time, throwing the
people around inside them had you?

A. No.
Q. Had you ever received any such report
other than the plaintiff's allegations in
this case with regard to the Kimball 1210
elevators in that building at 185 South
State?
A. No.
(Record pp. 1289-1290).
(g) Mr. Russon explained that many of the service calls
were the result of a governor switch or other regulator switch
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being tripped by power fluctuations or other causes that did not
constitute a safety hazard,

(Record pp. 1282, 1283, 1291).

(h) When a switch would be "tripped" the elevator would
stop not in an abrupt manner, but would stop until the switch was
reset by a technician.

(Record p. 1285).

(i) Kimball conducted regular service inspections of
the elevator as a routine precaution.

(Record p. 1287).

(j) Some of the service calls were in response to the
elevator key switches being turned to independent operations so
that they would not respond to calls.
hazard.

This was not a safety

(Record p. 1291).
(k) The operation of the circuit switches which shut

down the elevator in an event of power fluctuations constituted
a safety precaution in the elevator system and was, in fact,
desirable.

(Record p. 1292).
(1) There is no difference in the guaranteeing the

safety of the elevators between the contracts proposed by Kimball
and the contracts signed by Boyer.
5.

(Record p. 1293) .

Plaintiff's fifth witness was the representative of

defendant Boyer Company, Mr. Dean Peterson.

Mr. Peterson testi-

fied that he acted as the property manager for the building in
question
accident.

at and

before

the time of the plaintiff's

(Record pp. 1299, 1300).

During this time he had no

recollection of elevator accidents having been reported.
p. 1323).
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alleged

(Record

Also,

although

an

experienced

and

qualified

property

manager, no evidence was produced regarding the standard of care
of building owners and managers or that there was a breach or a
violation

of

such

standard

in this

case.

No

evidence

was

produced to establish what additional safety measures Boyer could
have taken,

(Record pp. 1299-1348).

Mr. Peterson was questioned regarding two alleged elevator
accidents.

However, neither alleged "accident" was admitted for

the purpose of the truthfulness of whether the accident occurred
and

both

were

subsequent

to

plaintiff's

alleged

accident.

(Record pp. 1325, 1341-1343).
6.

Plaintiff's

next

witness

was

technician for Kimball Elevator Company.
offered

through

Mr. Williams

of

any

Mr.

Ed

Williams,

a

Again, no evidence was
accidents,

injuries

or

dangerous conditions in the elevators at 185 South State prior to
plaintiff's alleged accident.

(Record pp. 1349-1376).

Contrary

to plaintiff's brief, there was no testimony from Mr. Williams
that any of the service calls were for conditions that constituted a hazard to elevators users.

This included the so-called

"yo-yoing" incident which in reality was a gradual leveling off
of the elevator across a maximum distance of eight inches.
stated by Mr. Williams:
Q. Now then, what is it that you are
describing
here
with
the
phrase
"yo-yoing".
A. When the elevator comes into the floor it
will sometimes overshoot a little bit and
10

As

level back up. You have an eight inch
range so you can be four inches above or
four inches below the floor.
Q. Okay. So then if I understand, when you
say "yo-yoing," does that eight inch
range then set a limit in terms of the
fluctuation as the elevator is trying to
level off?
*

*

*

Q. Have you ever heard of anybody in the
process of the yo-yoing, the trying to
seek that level position in the elevator
of that process in and of itself,
injuring anybody?
A. No, I haven't.
(Record pp. 1372-1374).
Mr. Williams testified that the rising and falling by the
elevators

at

"impossible".
No

185 South

State, as claimed

by plaintiff, was

(Record p. 1373).

testimony

was

given

by

Mr.

Williams

as

to

the

availability of additional safety features that were not employed
by Boyer or Kimball.

(Testimony of Ed Williams, Record pp. 1349-

1376).
Despite

testimony

that

elevators

suddenly" if a circuit was flipped

could

stop

"pretty

(Record pp. 1361-1362) , no

testimony was given by Mr. Williams as to any such incidents
actually occurring causing any injury or danger to elevator users
at a time prior to plaintiff's alleged accident.
1375-1376).
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(Record pp.

7.

Plaintiff next called Renee Esson, another co-worker at

Parsons, Behle & Latimer.

Ms. Esson described "problems" with

the elevators which were the elevator "getting stuck" or the
"lights would be off" or the elevators otherwise not working
properly.

(Record p. 1381).

Ms. Esson also testified as to

personally being stuck in the elevators on one occasion.

(Record

p. 1382) . However, her incident was not reported that she knows
of.

(Record p. 1383) .

Ms. Esson admitted that no one was

injured in any of the incidents she was aware of.

(Record pp.

1386, 1387).
There was nothing from Ms. Esson's testimony with regard to
a violation of the common carrier standard as urged by plaintiff.
(Record pp. 1377-1388).
8.

Next was the other attorney for whom plaintiff worked

at Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Mr. Robert Hyde. Mr. Hyde testified
as to what was reported to him by plaintiff regarding her alleged
incident.
evidence

(Record pp. 1391-1393).
regarding

hazardous

He did not offer testimony or

or dangerous

conditions

in the

elevators at any time prior to plaintiff's alleged incident.
Likewise, Mr. Hyde offered no evidence to support a finding that
Boyer breached a common carrier duty of care.

(Testimony of

Robert Hyde (Record pp. 1390-1399)).
9.

The only other witness regarding the liability issues

in the case was plaintiff herself, Deanna Kleinert.
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Plaintiff's

testimony constitutes pages 1617 through 1675 of the record in
this case.
Her only testimony regarding "problems" with the elevators
before her alleged incident is found at pages 1627 through 1630
of the record.

Regarding that incident (elevators not working)

there was no evidence that it created a danger.

Rather, she and

another merely had to take the stairs instead.

Also, she could

not recall if it was ever reported.
Following

her

testimony

(See Record pp. 1327-1330) .

about

this

single

incident,

plaintiff proceeded to describe the alleged accident of April 16,
1984.

(Record pp. 1640-1647).

She then described her alleged

injuries and course of treatment thereafter.
1675).

(Record pp. 1649-

Plaintiff rested her case at page 1676.

No evidence was

offered through plaintiff of any other incidents prior to her
own, as to the standard of care of building owners or managers or
safety precautions that might have been taken.

(See testimony of

plaintiff, Deanna Kleinert, pp. 1617-1676).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I,
The record in this case is void of evidence which plaintiff
was required to produce in order to establish a prima facie case
against Boyer Company.

More particularly, plaintiff failed to

produce evidence of (a) the existence of a dangerous condition in
the elevators; (b) that Boyer Company knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known of the dangerous condition; or
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(c) that Boyer Company was on notice of the dangerous condition
in time to take corrective action.
Plaintiff

continues

to mistakenly

refer

to evidence of

operational interruptions with the elevators as constituting a
"dangerous condition". The evidence at trial clearly showed that
these "malfunctions" did not constitute evidence of a dangerous
condition and that most were annoyances.

Because of the lack of

evidence of a dangerous condition, plaintiff failed to establish
a prima facie case as set forth by decisions of the Utah Court of
Appeals including its decision in the prior appeal of this case.
POINT II,
Contrary to plaintiff's claim of error by the trial court,
this court's ruling on the summary judgment issue in the prior
appeal did not mandate that plaintiff's case be submitted to the
jury regardless of what evidence was presented.
The law of the case doctrine applies to rulings by superior
or co-equal courts in the same case on issues of law.
Court's

determination

in

the

prior

appeal

that

This

"sufficient

evidence" existed to preclude summary judgment was a factual
determination
verdict.

which

did

not

by

itself

preclude

a

directed

On remand from the first appeal, plaintiff maintained

her burden of proving a prima facie case which she failed to do.
The trial court was therefore not barred by reason of the prior
appeal from considering a directed verdict.
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POINT III,
Plaintiff's claim that the trial court committed error in
failing

to

submit

the

case

to

a

jury

on

a common

carrier

liability theory against Boyer Company fails both as a matter of
law and for lack of any evidence at trial tending to establish a
breach of such a standard of care.
Utah law has not recognized application of a common carrier
standard of care in the landlord-tenant relationship.

To the

contrary, this court has continued to apply a "reasonable care"
standard in such actions as recently as 1994.

These decisions

are subsequent to the case authority relied on by plaintiff.
Moreover, plaintiff's authority does not adopt common carrier
liability in the landlord-tenant context but is mere dicta and is
not controlling in the present case.
This court has already determined in the prior appeal that
the proper standard of care to be applied by the trial court was
one of "reasonable care".

That ruling on an issue of law by the

Court of Appeals constituted law of the case in this matter.
Finally, even if this court were to apply a common carrier
standard of care as the requisite duty of landlords vis-a-vis
their tenants, plaintiff failed at trial to produce evidence of
a violation of such a standard by the Boyer Company.

15

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE AND A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PROPER.
As in any appeal from the granting of a motion for directed
verdict, the inquiry is whether evidence was presented at trial
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

Plaintiff's case,

even considered in a light most favorable to her, fell far short
of

establishing

the

legal

requisites

of

her

claims

against

defendants.
A.

No Evidence was Offered that Established the Existence of a
Dangerous Condition of Which Defendants Had or Should Have
Had Knowledge,
It is important to note that confusion has existed in this

case, and continues to exist in the mind of plaintiff, as to what
constitutes a dangerous condition necessitating either repair or
replacement of the elevators in question by defendants.
this Court in Kleinert

Indeed,

I specified that it was the existence of

a "dangerous condition" known to these defendants or of which
they should have had knowledge that gives rise to the duty to
repair or replace.

See Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co. , 854

P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993).
Plaintiff still fails to distinguish between a dangerous
condition
Indeed,
"service

in the elevators and "problems" or "malfunctions".

plaintiff
calls" on

relies
the

on

the

elevators

mere

fact

that

in question

conclusion that the elevators were "dangerous".
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to

there

were

support

a

This Court should not be drawn into the same mistake of
equating malfunctions with a dangerous condition.
As stated by this Court in Kleinert

I:

When a plaintiff's claim is based on the
owner's failure to repair rather than on
affirmative negligence, the plaintiff has
the burden of showing the owner knew, or in
the exercise of ordinary care should have
known, a dangerous condition existed and the
owner had sufficient time to take corrective
action.
Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
As recently as 1994, this Court has applied the same test.
In Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P. 2d 570 (Utah App.
1994) , this Court cited with approval the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 288 C (1965):
Rather, the focus is whether "a reasonably
prudent person should have known, or could
have learned by the exercise of reasonable
care," that a dangerous condition existed.
Schreiter, 871 P.2d at 575 (emphasis added).
In
evidence

the

present

that

interruptions.1

the

case

plaintiff

elevators

were

not

succeeded
free

in

from

producing

operational

However, no evidence was produced of a dangerous

condition.
There was also limited evidence of alleged "accidents" in
the

elevators

which

occurred

in

1

1986

and

1988,

long

after

Examples of this evidence includes plaintiff's testimony that
she experienced one incident where the elevator would not respond
to the call button and she was forced to take the stairs. (Record
pp. 1628-1629); Renee Esson's testimony that "occasionally an
elevator would get stuck or it wouldn't open properly or the lights
would be off". (Record p. 1381).
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plaintiff's alleged incident in 1984.2

However, there was no

evidence of any such incidents before plaintiff's accident so
that

Boyer

action."

Company

"had

sufficient

time

to

take

corrective

Kleinert, 854 P.2d at 1028.

The present action is indistinguishable from the case before
this Court in Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs. , Ltd. , 754 P. 2d 89
(Utah App. 1988), which was cited by this Court in Kleinert

I.

Like the present case the claim in Gregory was an action for
personal injuries against a landlord.
case,

the

trial

court

granted

the

Also, as in the present
landlord's

motion

for

directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case at trial.
appeal

of

the

directed

verdict

the

Utah

Court

of

a
On

Appeals

announced the standard of the landlord's duty of care to be as
follows:
The
plaintiff
must
demonstrate
that
defendant knew, or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known, that a
dangerous
condition
existed
and
that
sufficient
time
had
elapsed
to
take
corrective action.
Id. at 91.
Applying this standard the Court of Appeals reviewed the
evidence

and

found

that

there

was

no

evidence

offered

by

plaintiff that defendant had notice "of any defects or potentially

hazardous

conditions".

Id.

2

In concluding

that

the

Over objections as to relevancy and the hearsay nature of
these alleged incidents, the trial court permitted plaintiff's
counsel to question witnesses about these incidents but only for
the purpose of showing the reporting process to Boyer Company.
(See Record pp. 1325-1326 and pp. 1341-1342).
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directed verdict was proper, this Court announced the principle
that:
The mere fact that the building collapsed
with the snow accumulation weighing approximately 10-13 pounds per square foot is not
sufficient
evidence
to
establish
that
defendant breached its duty of reasonable
care toward plaintiff.
*

*

*

We concluded the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to persuade a reasonable person that defendant violated any duty
owed plaintiff or that the collapse of the
building was due to defendant's negligence.
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's
directed verdict.
Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
In Gregory, the plaintiff was aware of the accumulation of
snow (a problem) and was aware of creaking noises coming from the
roof (another problem).

However, as this Court found, there was

no evidence that such "problems" constituted a safety hazard or
that they were communicated to the defendant in time to determine
if there was a dangerous condition and to take corrective action.
In the present case there was evidence offered at trial of
routine operational interruptions with the elevators, but no
evidence to establish a dangerous condition that was in turn
communicated to the Boyer Company.

The lack of such evidence

defeats a prima facie element of plaintiff's case, see Williams
v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985), and a directed verdict
is proper.

See also, Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.f 565 P.2d

1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977).

B.

The Documentary Evidence of Service Calls and the Elevator
Service Contracts Did Not Establish Evidence of a Dangerous
Condition,
As in the prior appeal, plaintiff at trial relied upon

receipts showing service calls by Kimball Elevator Company to the
elevators at 185 South State to establish a prima facie case of
a dangerous condition and a knowledge thereof by Boyer Company.3
While it is true that the service receipts were known to the
Boyer Company, the evidence at trial clarified the receipts and
showed them in their true light.

That is, evidence of service

calls on routine, non-hazardous matters.

These receipts did not

put Boyer Company on notice of a "dangerous condition".
plaintiffs

counsel questioned

service receipts.

two witnesses

Both testified

At trial

regarding

these

that the receipts did not

evidence a safety hazard in the elevators.

See testimony of

Brent Russon, pp. 1283, 1289 and testimony of Ed Williams, Record
pp. 1373-1376.
Finally, plaintiff attempted to establish a violation of the
"reasonable care" standard by showing that the Boyer Company
declined

Kimball's

contract.4

3

initial proposal

The hoped-for

for

an

elevator

service

implication was that Boyer Company

These receipts constituted Trial Exhibit P8.

4

This evidence consisted of Kimball's initial service
contract proposal in July 1983, exhibit 3-P; a subsequent Kimball
proposed exhibit 4-P; and the signed contract between Kimball and
Boyer, exhibit 5-P. Mr. Russon, Kimball's manager, testified that
the differences in the contract proposals did not affect the kind
of service the elevators received, only how service was paid for.
(See Record pp. 1260-1261, 1287-1288).
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opted for a contract that was inadequate to assure the safety of
the elevators.

Again, plaintiff failed in this regard,

Mr.

Brent Russon, the manager for Kimball Elevator with whom Boyer
dealt on the elevator service contracts, testified:
Q. Do you feel by not accepting your initial
bid or proposal that they [Boyer Company]
were short-changing or neglecting in any
way the safety or the effective operation
of the elevators?
A. There's two questions there.
safety, one is the operation.

One

is

Q. Okay.
A. I feel that they were not compromising
the
safety.
I
do
believe
that
maintenance is required on elevators and
that's why a proposed maintenance. And
if I didn't, if I felt that it was not
necessary I wouldn't propose it.
So
maintenance is necessary but I don't feel
they compromised the safety.
(Record p. 1280).
Again, Mr. Russon testified:
Q. The same features, so far as frequency of
visit and the service that you provided
in guaranteeing the safety of those
elevators, existed regardless of which
contract it was?
A. Yes.
(Record p. 1293).
In short, neither the service receipts nor the negotiated
service contract between Boyer and Kimball evidenced a dangerous
condition that defendants either knew of or should have known of
before plaintiff's accident.

Likewise, these exhibits did not
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evidence that Boyer in any way compromised the safety of the
elevators or breached the "reasonable care" standard.5
POINT II.
THE PRIOR APPEAL DID NOT PRECLUDE THE TRIAL
COURT FROM GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT.
A.

This C o u r t s Order on Remand From the Prior Appeal Did Not
Require Submission to the Jury*
Plaintiff's

Kleinert

I

argument misconstrues

this Court's order

in

and reads into the Court's order more than exists.

After considering the issue of summary judgment in favor of Boyer
Company

and

ordered:

reversing

the

trial

court's

ruling,

this

Court

"Accordingly, we will reverse and remand this issue to

the trial court for further proceedings."

Kleinert, 854 P.2d at

1028.
The order of remand for "further proceedings" was the sum
and substance of the Court's order.

There can be no doubt that

this Court could have entered an order of the type plaintiff
suggests.

See Utah R. App. P.

3 0(a).

However, this Court

properly remanded only for "further proceedings".

Plaintiff

confuses the language of the opinion with the terms of this
Court's order.

As recognized by this Court in Amax Magnesium v.

State Tax Comm'n, 848 P.2d 715 (Utah App. 1993):

5

Plaintiff did not produce evidence, in the form of expert
opinion testimony, as to the standard of care among owners or
managers of commercial property in the community. The only witness
with such knowledge was Boyer's representative, Mr. Dean Peterson.
Mr. Peterson was not questioned about either a "reasonableness"
standard of care or a common carrier standard. (Record pp. 12991348) .
22

Where the language used in the body of an
appellate opinion conflicts with directions
on remand, the latter controls.
Id. at 718, cited with approval in In Re Estate of Painter v.
Colorado, 671 P.2d 1332 (Colo. App. 1983).
The trial court therefore did not violate this C o u r t s order
from Kleinert

I and was not obligated to submit the case to the

jury, regardless of whether plaintiff established her prima facie
case.
Plaintiff's argument that a directed verdict was precluded
merely by the prior appeal must also be rejected for reasons of
common sense and policy considerations.

The denial of a summary

judgment does not relieve the prevailing party of his or her
burden

to

establish

the

prima

facie

elements

of

a

case.

Plaintiff's argument, extended to its logical conclusion, would
permit her to reach a jury on the issue of liability without
presenting any evidence but merely because a prior appellate
ruling had denied summary judgment.
Plaintiff's argument not only misconstrues

this Court's

order for "further proceedings" but would absolve herself of any
requirement to produce evidence at trial or establish the prima
facie elements of her case.
B.

The Law of the Case Did Not Preclude a Directed Verdict,
As noted above, this Court's order in Kleinert

"further proceedings".

I was for

Accordingly, there is nothing inconsis-
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tent with this order and the granting of a directed verdict at
the close of plaintiff's case.
The law of the case doctrine, as argued by plaintiff in her
brief, is inapplicable because said doctrine has been held to
apply only to a conclusive resolution of issues of law as opposed
to

factual

determinations.

Governor's

Ranch

v.

Mercy

of

Colorado. 793 P.2d 648 (Colo. App. 1990); Zavarelli v. Might, 779
P.2d 489 (Mont. 1989).
no

application

to

As such, the law of the case doctrine has

the

trial

court's

determination

of

the

sufficiency of evidence on a motion for directed verdict.
Indeed, the general rule is that the law of the case applies
only to issues of law and does not bind the trial court as to
fact issues:
The general principle seems to be that the
doctrine of the law of the case applies only
to determinations of questions of law and
not to questions of fact. It has been said
that the doctrine of the law of the case
applies to all questions of law identical to
those on the former appeal, and on the same
facts and to the same questions only, that
the doctrine is rarely, and in a very
limited classification, applied to matters
of evidence as distinguished from rulings of
law, and that a decision on appeal on a
question of fact does not generally become
the law of the case, nor estop the parties
on a second trial from showing the true
state of facts.
5 Am.Jur.2d 198, Appeal and Error § 755 (1962) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Montana in Zavarelli v. Might, supra,
held that the trial court is not precluded by the appellate
court's order on a prior appeal from examining the evidence and
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reaching

a

new

result

as

a part

of

remand

for

"further

proceedings":
When this Court reversed the first
judgment of the District Court as to a
prescriptive easement, and remanded the
cause to the District Court for further
proceedings, the cause was then before the
District Court in the posture of not having
a final judgment. In that situation, when
there is nothing in the terms of the mandate
to prevent itf the trial court has the
power, on reconsideration, to find the same
facts and change its holding, or to find
different facts consistent with its original
holding*
Id* at 493 (emphasis added).

See also. Imperial Chemical Indus.,

Ltd. v. National Distillers and Chemical Corp. , 354 F.2d 459 (2nd
Cir. 1965).
Moreover, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable here
because, as admitted by plaintiff in her brief, the evidence
considered by this court in Kleinert
(See Appellant's Brief, p. 7).
evidence was "fully explored".

I was "in cursory form".
Whereas at trial the same

(Id. p. 7). In other words, the

so-called "malfunctions" that were before this Court on the prior
appeal were brought out, explained

and shown by the trial

witnesses to relate only to operational interruptions of the
elevators and were not evidence of a dangerous condition.

(See

discussion under Point I, supra.)
Courts from this and other jurisdictions have recognized
that a common exception to the law of the case doctrine is
created by the introduction of new evidence to the court.
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See

Richardson v. Grand Central Corp,P

572 P.2d

395

(Utah 1977)

("Court may reconsider an issue already decided if presented
again in a different light"); Moore v. 1600 Downing Street, Ltd,,
668 P.2d 16 (Colo. App. 1983) (Issues previously decided may be
reconsidered when new evidence is before the court).
In the present case the "new evidence" was the explanation
by plaintiff's own witnesses that the "malfunctions" did not
create a dangerous condition but in fact were safety responses by
the circuits and other mechanisms of the elevator system.
The effect of the jury trial held

in this case was to

eliminate the inferences and presumptions in favor of plaintiff
accorded by this court in consideration of the summary judgment
issue.

At trial the evidence was seen in the full light of

examination and explanation.

As a result, the new evidence

consisted of seeing the so-called "malfunctions" for what they
actually were and not as evidence of the dangerous condition.
In Osdol v. Knappton Corp., 755 P.2d 744 (Or. App. 1988),
the Oregon Court of Appeals dealt with similar issues.

Plaintiff

sued for personal injuries as a result of an automobile accident.
Defendants were the other driver and his employer who was sued on
the theory of respondeat superior.

The employer was granted

summary judgment on the issue of respondeat superior.

Plaintiff

appealed and the Oregon Appellate Court found an issue of fact
precluding summary judgment and remanded to the trial court.
Following remand, and at the close of the jury trial, plaintiff
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moved for a directed verdict on the respondeat superior issue.
The trial court denied a directed verdict on the grounds that the
prior appellate ruling constituted law of the case to the effect
that a fact issue existed thereby precluding a directed verdict.
In discussing

the trial court's erroneous assumption on the

effect of its prior ruling and application of the law of the case
doctrine, the Oregon Court framed the issues as follows:
The threshold question is whether the trial
court was correct in determining whether the
law of the case prevented it from directing
a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The law of
the case principle precludes relitigation or
reconsideration of a point of law decided on
appeal at an earlier stage of this same
case.
*

*

*

The question is whether that language
[prior appellate ruling] required submitting
the issue of respondeat superior to the jury
or determined only that Knappton [employer]
was not entitled to summary judgment.
Id. at 746 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
The

Oregon

Appellate

Court

found

that

the trial

court

committed error in applying the law of the case doctrine to
preclude the directed verdict.

In explaining the effect of its

prior appellate ruling, the Court stated:
Our holding did not prevent plaintiff from
raising the issue at trial by a motion for
directed verdict.
Id. at 746.
As in Osdol, where the trial court was not precluded by the
law of the case doctrine from granting a directed verdict, so in
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the present case it did not preclude the trial judge from
granting directed verdict which was otherwise appropriate for
lack of evidence of a dangerous condition or notice thereof to
Boyer Company.
POINT III,
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DIRECTED
VERDICT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF COMMON
CARRIER LIABILITY.
A.

Utah Law Does Not Recognize Common Carrier Liability in the
Present Case.
Plaintiff relies upon Lamb v. B & B Amusement Corp., 869

P.2d 926 (Utah 1993), to argue that Boyer Company was subject to
a common carrier standard of care.

However, the Utah Supreme

Court decision in that case does not stand for the proposition
urged by plaintiff.

That case was an action for injuries from

riding a roller coaster. On appeal from the granting of a motion
of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, plaintiff
argued that a common carrier standard of care should have been
applied by the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this
argument and refused to adopt the common carrier standard,
holding:
Consistent with the majority of courts that
have ruled on this issue, we hold that the
care required of amusement ride operators is
the care that reasonably prudent persons
would exercise under the circumstances.
Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
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The language of the decision in Lamb which plaintiff relies
upon to apply the common carrier standard in the present case is,
at best, dicta.

In distinguishing between the risks associated

with different types of transportation, the Utah court in dicta
stated:
The heightened standard of care required of
common carriers is predicated on the
principle that fl[p]ersons using ordinary
transportation devices, such as elevators
and buses, normally expect to be carried
safely, securely, and without incident to
their destination."
Id. at 930.
This language does not constitute an adoption of the common
carrier standard to the owners or operators of elevators. As the
Utah court in Lamb pointed out, the common carrier standard
normally only applies where a fee is charged by the carrier.
Where the Utah Supreme Court has refused to apply a common
carrier duty to amusement ride operators, this Court should not
apply it to landlords.
Not only have the courts of Utah not adopted the common
carrier standard as to commercial building owners or managers,
but the Utah Court of Appeals has reaffirmed, as recently as
1994, the

"reasonable

care" standard

in such cases.

See

Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994).
B.

The Lav of the Case Precludes Application of a Common
Carrier standard.
As noted above, the law of the case doctrine applies to

prior appellate court rulings on issues of law, not factual
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determinations.

An issue of law that was determined by this

Court in the prior appeal was the standard of care that applies
to Boyer Company,

As this Court held:

[T]he plaintiff has the burden of showing
the owner knew, or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known, a dangerous
condition
existed
and
the
owner
had
sufficient time to take corrective action.
Kleinert, 854 P.2d at 1028 (emphasis added).
For the reasons incorrectly applied by plaintiff to this
Court's factual determination, the law of the case doctrine did
indeed bind the trial court to apply the reasonable care standard
in this case following remand.

State v. Thomas, 777 P. 2d 445

(Utah 1989); Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988); Tracy
v. University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 1980).
C.

No Evidence was Presented to Establish Liability Under a
Common Carrier Standard,
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant was subject to a common

carrier standard of care as to the elevators, the record is void
of evidence to support a finding of

liability

under

such a

standard.
As already established, no evidence was offered showing the
existence of a dangerous condition or that the elevators were
"unreasonably

dangerous" or that Boyer Company had any

knowledge prior to plaintiff's alleged accident.

such

Plaintiff also

failed to produce any evidence as to what the standard of care
was among owners or managers of commercial buildings such as 185
South State.

Using the definition of the standard as unsuccess30

fully argued by plaintiff in Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.,
supra, it is still clear that plaintiff's evidence in this case
was lacking.

That definition stated:

"As a common carrier

defendant was required by law to use the highest degree of care
for the safe carriage of plaintiff, to provide everything reasonably necessary for that purpose and to exercise a reasonable
degree of skill."
Even this higher standard does not make a common carrier an
insurer

of the passenger's

safety.

Rather, the carrier

is

required to do what is "reasonably necessary" and to "exercise a
reasonable degree of skill".

In the present case there was no

evidence which established a breach of this standard.

There was

no evidence that a different make or model of elevator was safer,
no evidence that other elevator safety

features or equipment

was available or would have prevented plaintiff's accident6, no
evidence

that

other

building

managers

or

owners

took

any

different or additional safety precautions regarding elevators
and no evidence that what Boyer Company did or didn't do varied
from the "highest degree" of care.
In contrast to the lack of evidence showing that Boyer
Company could have done more to assure elevator

6

safety, the

The only elevator technician called was Mr. Ed Williams. He
was an employee of Kimball and had worked on the elevators at 185
South State and other locations having the same models. (Record pp.
1371-1371A). As the only mechanical expert, he testified that the
accident as described by the plaintiff in this case was impossible.
(Record p. 1373)
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representatives of Kimball Elevator testified that the elevators
were safe and Boyer Company acted responsibly:
1.

There was no period of time that the elevators were in

operation that they were not covered under a service agreement or
warranty.
2.

(Testimony of Brent Russon, Record pp. 1278-1280).
There was no compromise to the elevators' safety in the

service contract entered into between Boyer Company and Kimball.
(Testimony of Brent Russon, Record pp. 1280, 1288, 1293).
3.

The Boyer Company had procedures in place to report

after-hour service calls on the elevators to Kimball.

(Testimony

of Brent Russon, Record p. 1283) .
4.

The

Boyer

Company

respond to service calls.

never

requested

Kimball

not

to

(Testimony of Brent Russon, Record p.

1286) .
5.

The elevators in question were free of complaints or

reports that they were injuring or harming anyone.

(Testimony of

Brent Russon, Record p. 1289).
6.
same

The contract between Kimball and Boyer provided for the

inspections

contract.

and

service

as

any

other

Safety was not compromised.

elevator

service

(Testimony of Brent

Russon, Record p. 1293).
7.
the

The occasional leveling off or so-called "yo-yoing" of

elevators

never

produced

any

injuries

or

(Testimony of Ed Williams, Record pp. 1372-1374).
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complaints.

Given the lack of evidence regarding what other

safety

precautions, if any, Boyer Company could have taken, the jury
would

have been

required

to

indulge

in pure speculation

in

applying such a standard in this case.
CONCLUSION
The record in this case establishes that no evidence was
produced by plaintiff tending to show

(a) the existence of a

dangerous condition in the elevators, (b) that Boyer Company knew
or reasonably should have known of such a dangerous condition, or
(c) knowledge at a time before plaintiff's alleged accident in
order to take corrective measures.
Plaintiff's failure to produce such evidence is not justified by this Court's prior ruling on the summary judgment issue.
The trial court properly followed this Court's order to conduct
"further proceedings" and the directed verdict was proper both in
light of the absence of evidence to establish a prima facie case
and this Court's ruling that the applicable standard of care was
one of "reasonable care".
Plaintiff's argument to adopt a common carrier duty by
landlords as to tenants must be rejected because this Court has
already determined that the "reasonable care" standard applies in
this case.

The record also shows a lack of evidence in support

of liability under a common carrier standard of care.
Plaintiff

has

had

repeated

and

ample

opportunities

present evidence sufficient to establish a claim.
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to

She had three

days before a jury and did not produce evidence of a prima facie
case.

The trial court properly directed a verdict.

This Court

should affirm the order of the court below as the only decision
warranted by the record in this matter.
Respectfully submitted this

&%

day of March, 1995.
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